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For Whom the Court Tolls: Equitable Tolling
of the AEDPA Statute of Limitations in
t
Capital Habeas Cases
Aaron G. McCollough*

In 1992, an all-white North Carolinajuryfound Kenneth BernardRouse,
an African American, guilty of rape andfirst-degreefelony murder.' On
the jury's recommendation, the judge sentenced Rouse to death, and the
North CarolinaSupreme Court affirmed.2 After sentencing, one of the
jurors admittedto purposefully concealingprejudicialinformation during
voir dire in order to remain on thejury to convict Rouse. When potential
jurors were asked if any family members had been victims of a violent
crime, thejurorfailedto reportthat his mother had been rapedandkilled
by an African-American man who was later executedfor the crime.4 The
juroralso concealedhis strongracialprejudice duringvoir dire, after the
trial, he reportedly stated that "niggers"care less about life than white
people and that they rape women to brag to theirfriends.5
Upon discovery of this new evidence, Rouse collaterally attacked the
imposition of a capitalsentence in state court on a theory ofjurorbias, but
the courtdenied reliefwithout a hearing.6 After exhaustingpossiblestate
remedies, Rouse's appointed attorneyfiled a federal habeaspetition on

t This Note received the 2004 W&L Law Council Law Review Award for Outstanding
Student Note.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2005; Bachelor of Arts, University of Michigan, 2000. 1would like to thank Professor Scott
Sundby and Mark Snider for their invaluable assistance in the creation of this Note.
Additionally, I thank Professor Roger Groot, Professor Frank Bowman, the Washington and Lee
Law Council, and the Law Review Editorial Board for their comments and support. Finally, I
thank my wife Laura for her remarkable patience.
I. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238,257 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Motz, J., dissenting)
(stating the factual basis for Rouse's habeas claim), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004).
2. See State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543, 574 (N.C. 1994) (affirming the capital sentence).
3. Rouse, 339 F.3d at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting) (stating Rouse's claim for juror
misconduct).
4. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
5. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 242 (explaining the procedural posture of the case).

366

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 365 (2005)
February8, 2000.7 The district court noted that the one-year statute of
limitationsfor filing a federal habeas petition expired on February 7,
2000, the previous day, and dismissed the petition as untimely.a Sitting en
banc, the Fourth Circuitaffirmed the dismissal.9 The reasonfor the oneday delay? Rouse's attorney erroneously reliedon thefacially-applicable
"mailbox rule,"'0 under which the petition would have been timely.'
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I1. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that the
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denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004).
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I. Introduction

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was signed
into law on April 24, 1996.12 For the first time in history, defendants seeking
3
initial federal habeas corpus review were subject to a filing deadline. Under
this deadline, defendants must file their federal habeas petitions within one year
4
of the conclusion of their direct appeal in the state system.1 Due to the
confusion of state law and the AEDPA itself, however, defendants occasionally
5
miss this deadline, sometimes by just a few days.'
Defendants seeking federal habeas review of state-imposed capital
sentences are often poor and uneducated.' 6 Recognizing this problem,
Congress passed a statute entitling every indigent capital defendant to
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) ("A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court."); see also I RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 5.2 (4th ed. 2001) ("Until 1996, there was no fixed statute of

limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions.").
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) (stating the date upon which the statute of
limitations shall begin to run). Although conclusion of direct appeal is the most common
starting point for the statute of limitations, § 2244 actually provides four possible starting
points: (1) the date of conclusion of direct appeal; (2) the date on which a state-created
unconstitutional impediment to filing is removed; (3) the date on which the right asserted by the
habeas petitioner is first recognized by the Supreme Court; or (4) the date on which newly
discovered evidence forming the factual basis for the petitioner's claim could have been
discovered by due diligence. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
15. See, e.g., Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (listing cases
where deadline missed by just a few days), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004); Lookingbill v.
Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264-65 nn. 15-16 (5th Cir. 2002) (same).
16. AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE
REPORT AND PROPOSAL

4 (1989) [hereinafter

POWELL COMMITTEE]

uniformly are indigent, and often illiterate or uneducated.").

("Capital inmates almost
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representation by appointed counsel during federal habeas proceedings.' 7
Although entitled to counsel, defendants retain little control over the
appointment process.' 8 Due to the shortage of qualified attorneys available for
appointment, these indigent defendants must sometimes rely on representation
by overburdened or inadequate counsel.' 9 Fault generally lies with this
appointed counsel when a defendant files his habeas petition after expiration of
the one-year AEDPA deadline. 20 Regardless, courts have determined that
defendants are strictly and vicariously liable for any errors committed by their
appointed counsel, 2 ' and principles of constitutionally ineffective counsel do
not apply in habeas proceedings.22 Attorney error thus precludes any possibility
of federal review for a significant number of defendants facing the death
penalty.
To remedy problems arising from negligent appointed counsel, habeas
scholarship is replete with calls for extending the guarantee of effective counsel
to postconviction proceedings. 23 This Note, however, suggests a far more
modest approach. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to toll a
statute of limitations when extraordinary circumstances make rigid application

17. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that any state defendant facing the death
penalty is entitled to counsel in federal habeas proceedings). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that capital defendants are not entitled to counsel under the Constitution. See Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (explaining that defendants are not constitutionally entitled
to appointment of counsel during postconviction procedures, even in capital cases).
18. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guaranteesfor Capital State PostConviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 348, 353-64
(2003) (discussing the problem of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and conducting a
survey of state mechanisms enacted to ensure adequate representation).
19. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense
Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 902-03 (1996)
(stating that capital defendants represented by appointed counsel are often no better off in
federal habeas proceedings than pro se defendants).
20. See infra Part 1II.B (discussing the difficulties faced by attorneys in meeting the
deadline).
21. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,754 (1991) (stating that attorney error
short of ineffective assistance of counsel may be attributed to the defendant).
22. See id. at 752 (stating that constitutional principles of ineffective counsel are
inapplicable where the defendant has no constitutional right to counsel).
23. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 7.2f (arguing that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments should require assistance of counsel in capital postconviction
proceedings); Andrew Hammel, DiabolicalFederalism: A FunctionalCritiqueand Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 63-69 (2002)
(arguing that there is a constitutional right to postconviction counsel); Michael A. Mello, Is
There a Federal ConstitutionalRight to Counselin CapitalPost-ConvictionProceedings?,79
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1078 (1989) (same).

EQUITABLE TOLLING OF THE AEDPA
of that statute unfair.24 Most courts have drawn upon this equitable power only
sparingly in the capital habeas context, 2s finding that defendants facing the
death penalty should have no greater access to equitable tolling than noncapital
defendants.26 In the case of Kenneth Rouse, described above, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the error by Rouse's attorney in miscalculating the
statute of limitations did not warrant equitable tolling.27 A more nuanced
understanding of the AEDPA's fundamental purpose, however, reveals the
essential role of equitable doctrines in accomplishing the AEDPA's goals. The
doctrine of equitable tolling, in its current form, properly applies to ameliorate
negligent untimely filings by appointed capital habeas counsel. Correct
application of the equitable tolling doctrine would thereby provide capital
defendants with meaningful access to counsel, while still promoting the
AEDPA's countervailing goal of ensuring efficient and final resolution of
federal habeas claims.
Part II of this Note briefly traces the history of the writ of habeas corpus,
focusing on the importance of federal habeas review of state capital sentences.
Part I discusses Congress's goals in passing the AEDPA and describes the
practical operation of the statute of limitations. Part IV then looks to case law
to elucidate the circumstances under which courts have equitably tolled the
AEDPA deadline in capital cases, highlighting the current split in the federal
24. See, e.g., Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the
AEDPA filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling). See generally David D. Doran,
Comment, Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time Limitations: A CongressionalIntent
Analysis, 64 WASH. L. REv. 681 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that
equitable tolling should only rarely be applied); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.
1999) (stating that courts only equitably toll the AEDPA deadline in "rare and exceptional
circumstances" (quoting Davis, 158 F.3d at 811)). The Harris court stated:
[A]ny invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of astatute of limitations
must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship
supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes. To apply equity generously would
loose the rule of law to whims about the adequacy of excuses, divergent responses
to claims of hardship, and subjective notions of fair accommodation.
Harris,209 F.3d at 330.
26. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating that the
existence of a capital sentence receives no consideration in the equitable tolling analysis), cert.
denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004). Other courts, however, have reached a contrary result. See, e.g.,
Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2001) (permitting equitable tolling of the
AEDPA's statute of limitations because the court found that capital cases require extra
consideration); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.
1997) (giving weight to the capital sentence when equitably tolling the statute of limitations for
attorney error).
27. See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 251 (refusing to equitably toll the statute).
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circuits. Part V imports the equitable tolling analysis into the AEDPA
framework, identifying several bases in statutory text and case law that
advocate equitably tolling the AEDPA deadline to ameliorate error by
appointed habeas counsel. Before concluding, Part VI contains a condensed
practical analysis that underscores the inequity of refusing to toll the filing
deadline for attorney error in capital habeas cases.
II. The Great Writ
A. Evolution of the Writ
The writ of habeas corpus, the Great Writ, 28 traces its roots to thirteenthcentury England.29 Since its inception, defendants have used habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of the government's custody.30 A federal prisoner's right
to petition for habeas relief is embodied in the United States Constitution under
the Suspension Clause. 3 1 After 1867, the right to federal habeas corpus has
also extended by statute to state prisoners seeking federal review of state
convictions.32 The Habeas Corpus Act of 186733 ensured that any defendant
28. See Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change,44 OHiO ST. L.J.
337, 337-45 (1983) (discussing the history of the Great Writ).
29. See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
(1980) (describing the origins of the Great Writ); Rosenn, supra note 28, at 337-38 (noting the
influence of English common law on American habeas corpus law).
30. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963) ("Habeas lies to enforce the right of
personal liberty; when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the power
to release him."), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); 1 HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 2.3 (describing the evolution of the writ and tracing its usage).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege ofthe Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
32. See DUKER, supra note 29, at 181-224 (explaining the historical extension of federal
habeas review to include state defendants); see also Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the
Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to FederalHabeas Corpus for State
Prisoners?, 92 MicH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Suspension Clause, thus mandating federal habeas corpus review for state
prisoners). Although broadly rejected, at least one federal court has expressly adopted Professor
Steiker's view. See Rosa v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ. 2468, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11177, at
*34 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1997) (stating that the Suspension Clause is incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee habeas review for state prisoners), ajfd on othergrounds,
148 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
33. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000)). In
Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868), the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 for the first time. Chief Justice Chase, writing for the Court,
stated:
This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas
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seeking to challenge a state conviction could receive habeas review in federal
court for alleged violations of federal constitutional rights.34
The scope of federal habeas review over state convictions expanded
exponentially through the middle part of the twentieth century.3 5 The Warren
Court extended authority to federal courts to review factual disputes de novo in
habeas proceedings.36 In another expansion, the Supreme Court ruled that the
procedural default rules applying to state direct appeal did not apply to state
collateral proceedings. 3 The tide of habeas expansion, however, soon began to
recede, beginning in the 1970s.38 In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court
cut back the federal courts' jurisdiction and scope of review over state
convictions. 39 The Court strengthened preclusion rules concerning
42 total
41
exhaustion, 40 procedural default, and deference to state factfinding.
corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of
privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is
impossible to widen this jurisdiction.
Id. at 325-26.
34. See DUKER, supra note 29, at 189-94 (discussing the effects ofthe Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867).
35. See Rosenn, supra note 28, at 343-44 (describing the Warren Court era as the
"zenith" of the writ's expansion).
36. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,312(1963) ("[W]here an applicant for a writ of
habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to
which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew."),
overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
37. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (rejecting the suggestion that failure to
exhaust every possible state claim precludes a defendant from receiving federal habeas review),
overruled by Keeney v. Tarnayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). The Fay Court decided that,
although intelligent and knowing waiver of the right to appeal may constitute procedural
default, the defendant in Fay did not knowingly waive this right. Id. at 399. Even though the
defendant failed to exhaust his right to appeal a state proceeding, state remedies were no longer
available at the time of the federal habeas petition, and the defendant had thus fulfilled his
exhaustion requirement. Id.
38. See 1 HERTZ & LEBM AN, supra note 13, § 2.4d (discussing habeas reform by
Congress and the Supreme Court prior to the AEDPA); see also Hammel, supra note 23, at 711 (discussing the Supreme Court's shift toward limiting access to habeas corpus through the
exhaustion doctrine and procedural default).
39. See Rosenn, supra note 28, at 355-63 (describing the Supreme Court's narrowing of
habeas review).
40. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1982) (requiring federal habeas petitioners
to exhaust all claims contained in the petition before a federal court may review any claim in the
petition).
41. See Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982) (reinforcing that a defendant must
show cause and actual prejudice to overcome procedural default).
42. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992) (requiring courts to apply the
cause-and-prejudice standard for procedural default when state findings of fact were
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Despite the significant limitations imposed on access to habeas corpus in
the latter part of the twentieth century, a defendant's right to seek initial habeas
corpus review was never limited by a statute of limitations until passage of the
AEDPA in 1996. 43 Since its introduction, the right to seek federal habeas
corpus stayed free of time constraints. 44 As such, habeas corpus operated as a
vital means of protecting a defendant's constitutional rights at any time,
particularly for capital defendants.45
B. FederalHabeas Corpus in CapitalCases
After Furman v. Georgia46 ushered in the modem era of capital
punishment, federal habeas review has remained an essential mechanism for
inadequate); see also Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: StandardsofReviewfor Habeas Corpus
Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1868, 1874-76 (1997) (discussing the

scope of federal review under the AEPDA concerning findings of fact).
43. See, e.g., Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957) (stating that federal courts
must grant relief from constitutional violations at any time, regardless of when the habeas
petition is filed). The Court stated:
Evidently it also needs to be repeated that the overriding responsibility of this Court
is to the Constitution of the United States, no matter how late it may be that a
violation of the Constitution is found to exist. This Court may not disregard the
Constitution because an appeal in this case, as in others, has been made on the eve
of execution. We must be deaf to all suggestions that a valid appeal to the
Constitution, even by a guilty man, comes too late, because courts, including this
Court, were not earlier able to enforce what the Constitution demands.
Id.
44. See Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute ofLimitations on the
FederalHabeas CorpusPetitionsofState Prisoners,70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1514-18 (1997)

(noting that despite several proposed laws imposing astatute of limitations on habeas petitions,
the AEDPA was the first such legislation actually enacted into law).
45. This indefinite access to habeas corpus led to abusive successive filing by capital
defendants. Seeking to stay executions, capital defendants could exercise their right to habeas at
any time, thus leading to extraordinary delays in carrying out executions. See Thomas P.
Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Bureau ofJustice StatisticsBulletin: CapitalPunishment,2002, at

11 (Nov. 2003) (providing statistics regarding the average time elapsed between initial
sentencing and actual execution), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp02.pdf
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman,the Supreme Court
addressed whether the capital punishment schemes of Georgia and Texas violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 239. Three defendants sentenced to death appealed the
constitutionality of their sentences. Id. All nine Justices wrote individual opinions, and none of
the five Justices making up the majority joined in the opinion of another Justice. Common
themes from the plurality opinions, however, revealed concern about the lack of legislative
guidance to prevent arbitrary exercise ofjudicial discretion, along with selective application of
the death penalty to minorities and the poor. The Court ultimately struck down the death
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protecting defendants' federal constitutional rights in state capital
proceedings.47 Only a tiny proportion of death sentences handed down by
states actually result in executions. 48 James Liebman's exhaustive study4 9 ofthe
rate by which actual execution occurs after an initial imposition of a capital
sentence estimates that only 5.4% of death penalties imposed between 1973 and
1995 resulted in executions. so The Liebman study estimates that 40% of the
state capital sentences that found their way to federal habeas review s' were
overturned due to serious error.12 Other studies, including one by the
penalty schemes of Georgia and Texas as violative ofthe Eighth Amendment's protection from
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 239. In so doing, the Court invalidated the statutes
authorizing capital punishment in thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
After Furman, state lawmakers revisited their capital sentencing legislation to ensure
accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Four years after Furman,the
Supreme Court upheld several revised death penalty procedures that met the standards of
Furman in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its companion cases: Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Furman remains the
landmark case in modem capital punishment jurisprudence. For a discussion of the rationale in
Furman and its lasting effect in death-penalty law, see generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of
CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
47. See James S. Liebman et al., CapitalAttrition: ErrorRates in CapitalCases, 19731995, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1839, 1846-60 (2000) (discussing error rates of state-imposed capital
sentences in post-Furman cases that were reversed in habeas corpus proceedings).
48. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing the rates of execution for
defendants sentenced to death). The states currently authorizing the death penalty are Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, STATE BY
INFORMATION,
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
DEATH
PENALTY
STATE
article.php?did= 121 &scid= I1(last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
49. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, PartII: Why There Is So Much Errorin
Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/broken
system2/index2.html (Feb. 1I, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See Liebman et al., supra note 47, at 1846 (relating empirical evidence of actual
executions as a proportion of capital sentences handed down).
51. Liebman's group also provides reversal rates for state postconviction procedures. The
Liebman study approximates that over 46% of capital sentences are reversed for serious error in
direct appeal or state postconviction procedures. See Liebman et al., supra note 49, at L.A
(noting overall statistics). Of the remaining 54% of death verdicts, 40% are reversed for serious
error during federal habeas review. Id.
52. Id.; see also James S. Liebman, The OverproductionofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
2030, 2052 & n.90 (2000) (discussing the rates by which courts at various stages of
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Department of Justice (DOJ), also attest to the significant role played by
postconviction review of state capital convictions.53 According to DOJ
statistics, over 77% of defendants sentenced to death between 1973 and 2002
ultimately left death row through means other than execution.5 4 Another study
indicates that 73.2% of all capital habeas cases heard in federal court resulted in
rulings favorable to the defendant.55 Clearly, these statistics indicate that
federal review of capital sentences, which is the last level of review for most
capital defendants, provides an essential forum for ensuring that defendants
facing an irrevocable punishment receive the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Narrowing or eliminating access to federal habeas corpus from
state convictions could produce dire consequences, as serious constitutional
56
errors in state convictions would go unreviewed by federal courts.
III. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996
A. Background
President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996,
concluding decades of debate in Congress about if and how it should reform
habeas procedures. In the end, the final impetus needed to enact the habeas
reform legislation came from the Oklahoma City bombing.5 7 Republicans,
strongly supported by President Clinton, reacted to the attack by pushing
stronger antiterrorism legislation through Congress. 58 Believing that Timothy
McVeigh would face the death penalty for the bombing, Congress attached the
postconviction review reverse state capital sentences).
53. See generally Bonczar & Snell, supra note 45 (providing a wide range of annual
statistics regarding capital punishment in the United States).
54. See id. at 14, app. tbl. 2 (providing statistics on the outcome of persons sentenced to
death). Between 1973 and 2002, a total of 7254 people were sentenced to death. Id. Of these,
3557 remained on death row at the end of 2002. Id. Of the 3597 people no longer on death
row, only 820 (22.1%) were executed. Id.
55. See Michael Mello, FacingDeath Alone: The Post-ConvictionAttorney Crisis on
Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 520-21 (1988) (citing statistics on success rates for capital
habeas petitioners).
56. See James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"? AEDPA andErrorDetection
in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. Rv.411, 427 (2001) (criticizing the foreclosure of federal
habeas corpus as a remedy for an ineffective death sentence).
57. See id. at 413 (describing the relationship between McVeigh's acts and the habeas
reform provisions of the AEDPA).
58. See id. (noting that the habeas reform bill, which was originally part of the Republican
"Contract with America" platform, passed through Congress only because President Clinton's
endorsement swayed some Democrats to vote for it).
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habeas reform measures to the antiterrorism bill to ensure efficient resolution of
his likely challenges.5 9 After so many years of redrafting and amending various
habeas reform bills, the final legislation ended up unwieldy, awkward, and
confusing. 6° Courts have grappled with the language and procedures of the
AEDPA, prompting one scholar to note:
The courts' efforts to work [the new AEDPA's rules] out resemble nothing
so much as the proverbial fire-fighter returning from a night on the towngroping, lurching, muzzy, trying with exquisite and exaggerated
concentration to make sense of utter incoherence, and beginning to wonder
vaguely whether the excitement of the task is worth the headache it is
bound to bring tomorrow morning.'

The general response to the legislation has been less than enthusiastic.
Congress's primary goal in passing the habeas reform provisions of the
AEDPA was to "to reduce the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed
and repetitive filings., 62 Frustrated with the long delays in implementing state
capital sentences created by successive federal habeas petitions,63 Congress set
out to expedite the federal review process and to create finality in judgments in
order to preserve efficacious state sentencing. 64 To ensure that efficiency and
finality would not completely undermine the value of federal habeas corpus for
6
capital defendants, however, Congress retained 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B),
which entitles every indigent capital defendant to appointed counsel during
federal habeas procedures. 66
59.

See id. (remarking on the unlikely coupling of antiterrorism legislation and habeas

reform).
60. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New HabeasCorpus Statute, 44 BuFF.L. REv.
381, 381 (1996) (attributing the statute's poor drafting to its tortuous and extended legislative
history).
61. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Forewordto I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at v. The
Supreme Court appears equally unimpressed with the drafting of the legislation. Justice Souter
remarked: "All we can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the [AEDPA] is not a
silk purse of the art of statutory drafting." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 104-23, at 9 (1995) ("[T]he bill is designed to reduce the abuse of
habeas corpus that results from delayed and repetitive filings.").
63. See Bonczar & Snell, supra note 45, at 11 (providing statistics on the average elapsed
time between sentence and execution).
64. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,436 (2000) (discussing the AEDPA's purpose
of furthering "the principles of comity, finality, and federalism").
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2000) (noting that, in addition to the guarantee of counsel
for capital defendants in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), the court may choose to appoint counsel for other
indigent defendants).
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that indigent defendants facing a stateimposed death penalty are entitled to counsel during federal habeas proceedings).
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The AEDPA brought comprehensive changes to the treatment of federal
claims by state prisoners without changing the fundamental framework of preexisting habeas law.6 7 The AEDPA's primary changes to habeas law involve
68
court findings, 69
the new statute of limitations, increased deference to state
strict limitations on successive habeas petitions, 70 and special procedures for
capital habeas petitioners.7 1 Considerable litigation has been undertaken to
smooth out the wrinkles in these new provisions, and much work remains.
B. The Statute ofLimitations
Section 2244(d) of Title 28 contains the AEDPA statute of limitations,
which states that a "1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for
a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

67. See Yackle, supra note 60, at 381 (noting that the AEDPA "takes the preexisting
habeas landscape as its baseline").
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations). See
generally Sessions, supranote 44.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1) (2000) (stating the deferential level of review over state
court findings of fact). See generally Kimberly Woolley, Note, ConstitutionalInterpretationsof
the AntiterrorismAct's HabeasCorpusProvisions,66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,432-40 (1998).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000) (providing strict limitations on court discretion to
review claims brought in successive habeas petitions). See generally Deborah L. Stahlkopf,
Note, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1115 (1998).
71. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2000) ("Special Procedures for Capital
Habeas Cases"). Chapter 154 to Title 28 of the United States Code contains a series of optional
federal procedures applicable to states that authorize the death penalty. Under Chapter 154,
states can "opt-in" to receive special, expedited federal habeas procedures that provide a short
statute of limitations and guarantees of finality. Id. § 2261(b). To opt into Chapter 154, the
state must meet extensive requirements regarding provision of counsel for capital defendants at
all stages of state and federal postconviction procedures. Id. §§ 2261(b)-(c). Presently, most
states have not officially opted into the special procedures found in Chapter 154. Until the optin procedures gain a greater foothold, the general habeas procedures in Chapter 153 continue to
govern capital habeas cases and, hence, are the subject of this Note. Some aspects of the opt-in
provisions are discussed below in Part V.B. For abroad discussion of the operation of Chapter
154, see generally Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2000); Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of
Capital Postconviction Counsel: ConstitutionalImplications of Statutory Grantsof Capital
Counsel, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 31, 62-63 (discussing Chapter 154, including the current levels of
state compliance); Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Note, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse
Justice?,47 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1998).
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State court. 72 The statute itself provides for limited tolling of the one-year
period under specific circumstances delineated in the statute.73
Any time during which a "properly filed" application for state
postconviction review is pending in state court, the limitations period is tolled.74
Because of the properly filed requirement, if a state application is ultimately
determined to have been improperly filed, the AEDPA's deadline is not
tolled.7 5 Bewildering state postconviction procedures and unclear filing
requirements often lead to defendants filing improper state applications.76
Although nearly every state that authorizes capital punishment now provides
some assistance of counsel at postconviction stages, 77 state procedural
requirements are often so confusing that even seasoned postconviction litigators
can have difficulties navigating through them.78 Procedural error during state
proceedings can thus be fatal later on as the AEDPA's one-year limitation
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
73. See id. § 2244(d)(2) (including the tolling provision).
74. See id. ("The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."). Under the exhaustion
doctrine, which is incorporated in the AEDPA at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A), the defendant is
required to exhaust all state postconviction remedies prior to seeking any federal review. See
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001) (discussing the exhaustion requirement of the
AEDPA); see also 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at ch. 23 (discussing exhaustion).
75. See Dictado v. Ducharme, 189 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that if Congress
intended the statute of limitations to toll for pending improperly filed applications, it would not
have included the "properly filed" language); see also Liebman, supra note 56, at 417-18
(discussing the problem of improperly filed state petitions). The Supreme Court will apparently
resolve the question of when a disallowed state application for postconviction review may be
deemed to be properly filed for purposes of the AEDPA. See Pace v. Vaughn, No. 02-3049, 71
Fed. Appx. 127, 128-29 (3d Cir. July 7, 2003) (discussing the problem of the improperly filed
state application), cert. grantedsub nom. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 73 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept.
28, 2004) (No. 03-9627).
76. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 184 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that even habeas
experts are often unable to determine whether state claims have actually been exhausted);
Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 370-71 (2d Cir. 2000) (disagreeing with the district court's
ruling that defendant failed to exhaust certain state claims).
77. See Hammel, supra note 23, at app. A (providing a complete list of states providing
postconviction appointed counsel and the remedy for incompetent counsel in each of the states).
Of the thirty-eight states currently authorizing the death penalty, thirty-six recognize some ight
to counsel during postconviction procedures. The two states that do not guarantee any form of
counsel during state postconviction procedures, even to capital defendants, are Georgia and
Alabama. See Hammel, supranote 18, at 364 (surveying state guarantees of counsel); see also
Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. 1999) (finding that capital defendants had no right
to counsel in postconviction procedures).
78. See I HERTZ& LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 6.1 (noting the diversity and complexity of
state postconviction procedures).
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continues to run, often expiring as defendants await resolution of their improper
state claims before attempting to file federal petitions.7 9 On the other hand,
federal habeas petitions filed before all available state remedies have been fully
exhausted will be dismissed as premature. 80 Adding to the confusion, many
states began implementing comprehensive reforms of state postconviction
procedures contemporaneous to the AEDPA's enactment, which has led to
unsettled state law.8' Furthermore, any time spent in the preparation of
materials necessary for state postconviction proceedings does not toll the
AEDPA statute of limitations-the statute is only tolled when state proceedings
are actually pending.
Although one year may initially seem more than adequate for an attorney
to file a habeas petition, in reality, the time limit will almost always be
insufficient. 82 During that year, the defendant must obtain counsel,8 3 pursue
79. See, e.g., Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a habeas
petition untimely when the defendant's attorney miscalculated the statutory tolling period for
pending state claims).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring an applicant to exhaust state
remedies before receiving federal habeas review).
81. See Hammel, supra note 23, at 11-12 (discussing the state reforms). While Congress
was enacting the AEDPA, death penalty states were also attempting to speed up postconviction
procedures and create stricter deadlines in capital cases. See, e.g., Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing Pennsylvania's new postconviction procedures as "inhibitively
opaque" at the time defendant was calculating statutory tolling of the AEDPA).
82. See Sessions, supra note 44, at 1567 (calling the imposition of a one-year statute of
limitations an "unmitigated disaster"). Although this Note focuses on the AEDPA deadline's
effect on capital cases, federal habeas review is, of course, an important protection for
noncapital defendants as well. The AEDPA statute of limitations applies equally to noncapital
defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000) (setting a one-year statute of limitations for all
petitions from state convictions). Furthermore, these defendants are forced to navigate the
labyrinth of state and federal postconviction procedures without help of counsel. See Liebman,
supra note 52, at 2043-45 (discussing the extreme difficulties for noncapital defendants caused
by the AEDPA deadline). Perhaps because of their lack of representation, but more likely
because of the special considerations regarded to capital defendants, noncapital defendants have
a far lower success rate in federal habeas review. See infra note 163 (comparing success rates of
capital and noncapital cases in federal habeas corpus).
Although the AEDPA's statute of limitations is harsh on unrepresented noncapital
defendants, other considerations could make the effect of the deadline less deleterious.
Noncapital defendants seeking federal habeas review are incarcerated, often raising issues
concerning the length of their sentences. Therefore, these defendants have some incentive to
proceed quickly, because their goal is reduction of their sentence. Capital defendants, on the
other hand, harbor different motives. Waiting on death row, these defendants seek to delay the
imposition of their punishment through successive petitions, constant appeals, and other delay
tactics. The finality of the one-year statute of limitations therefore clashes with the incentives of
the capital defendant more so than the noncapital defendant. Regardless of incentives,
exhausting state claims and filing a federal habeas petition remains an awesome task for an
unrepresented noncapital defendant.
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time-consuming state postconviction relief, calculate the AEDPA deadline, and
prepare the federal habeas petition. As the defendant waits for counsel to be
appointed, the AEDPA's one-year clock keeps ticking. 4 Departing from the
recommendations of the Powell Committee and the American Bar Association,
the AEDPA statute of limitations is not tolled while the defendant awaits
85
appointment of the habeas counsel guaranteed by 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).
Compounding the problem, Congress cut all federal funding for the Post
Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDOs) the same year that the AEDPA
was enacted.8 6 The elimination of the PCDOs, which provided a ready pool of
experienced and federally funded attorneys for appointment in capital habeas
cases, 87 could not have come at a worse time. Now courts face great difficulty
period.88
in finding and appointing a qualified attorney early in the one-year
Furthermore, once federal habeas counsel is finally appointed, that
attorney must still draft the federal habeas petition. Drafting a suitable habeas
petition in a capital case can require extensive research and careful scrutiny of
an immense record because the AEDPA requires fact pleading, not notice

83. Capital defendants seeking federal habeas relief are entitled to counsel throughout the
habeas proceedings. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000). The difficulty in finding competent
counsel to take on the complexities of death-penalty litigation is well documented. See
Woolley, supra note 69, at 428 (discussing the plight of capital defendants seeking their
statutorily-guaranteed counsel for federal habeas proceedings). Noncapital defendants,

however, have no right to counsel while seeking postconviction relief under federal law and the
law of most states. Therefore, many defendants are forced to navigate the tolling provisions of
the AEDPA by themselves to ensure the availability of federal review. See generally Sessions,
supra note 44 (arguing that one year is often inadequate to prepare a habeas petition and thus
constitutes deprivation of due process).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000) (stating that the statute of limitations continues to
run until the defendant's state claim is properly filed); see also Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293
F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the statute of limitations is not tolled while the
capital defendant waits for counsel to be appointed).
85. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000) (failing to provide for statutory tolling while a
defendant waits for appointment of federal habeas counsel), with POWELL COMMITTEE, supra
note 16, at 6 (stating that the statute of limitations should begin to run only at the time when
counsel is appointed), and IRA P. ROBBINS, AMER. BAR ASs'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND

EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES, at B- 10 (1990) (proposing a
statute of limitations that is tolled during any period in which the defendant is not represented
by counsel).
86. See Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This
Corpus?, 27 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 523, 540-44 (1996) (describing the congressional defunding of
the PCDOs).
87. See Howard, supra note 19, at 904-12 (discussing the function of the PCDOs).
88. See id. at 919-20 (describing the aftermath of the elimination of the PCDOs).
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pleading. Underpaid and overburdened appointed attorneys face difficulties
in meeting the statute of limitations. 90
Considering the sheer fortuitousness of receiving appointment of counsel

early on in the statutory period and the enormous amount of labor that the
appointed attorney must put forth during the year, the AEDPA's one-year

limitations period arbitrarily cuts off federal review for many diligent
defendants. In cases where a diligent defendant is unable to meet the deadline,
Congress has achieved its goal of efficiency but only at the expense of ensuring
fair protection of constitutional rights. In such cases, the AEDPA's
corresponding focus on fair and final review of the merits of a petition is
defeated by a dysfunctional appointment system and incompetent counsel.

C. Redefining an "Applicationfor a Writ of Habeas Corpus" Under
McFarland v. Scott

Some commentators suggest that the AEDPA's statutory text provides the
key to correcting problems caused by overburdened and late-appointed federal
habeas counsel running up against the AEDPA statute of limitations. 9' Section
2244(d) of Title 28, which lays out the AEDPA statute of limitations, states that
a "1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 9 2 In
other words, defendants must "apply" for a writ of habeas corpus within the
delineated one-year period.
In McFarlandv. Scott, 93 a pre-AEDPA case, the Court discussed what

constituted "commencement" of federal habeas proceedings.94 The defendant
89. See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at ch. 11 (discussing the contents of the
petition); John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure,47 S.C. L. REv. 271, 275 (1996) (discussing how habeas petitions
differ from appellate briefs); Liebman, supra note 52, at 2043 (discussing the fact-intensive
pleading necessary for habeas pleading).
90. See Larry Yackle, Panel Discussion, CapitalPunishment. Is There Any Habeas Left
in This Corpus?, 27 LOY.U. Cn. L.J. 560, 563 (1996) (noting that "it's going to be nearly
impossible to comply" with the one-year deadline).
91. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 5.2b, at 267-69 (discussing McFarland).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
93. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994). In McFarland, the Supreme Court
considered when habeas proceedings are commenced for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q).
Id. at 851. The defendant was sentenced to death in Texas and sought a stay of execution just a
few days before the execution was to take place. Id. at 852. He filed apro se motion in federal
court stating that he "wish[ed] to challenge [his] conviction and sentence" under § 2254. Id.
The motion also requested appointment of counsel under § 848(q). Id. The district court
refused to appoint counsel, stating that under § 848(q) counsel may only be appointed once
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in McFarlandfiled a request for appointment of habeas counsel without first
filing a formal habeas petition. 95 The issue before the Court was whether the
request for counsel commenced habeas proceedings, thus giving the federal
court jurisdiction to appoint counsel and grant a stay of execution. 96 Toresolve
the issue, the Court interpreted the statutory language in 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(q)(4)(B), which provides:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28
seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation... shall be
entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys ....
The Court reasoned that requiring the defendant to file a complex habeas
petition without aid of counsel would substantially defeat the purpose of
providing assistance of counsel.98 For the appointment to be meaningful,
counsel must be appointed earlier to assist in the preparation of the petition.
The Court thus found that "a 'post conviction proceeding' within the meaning
of § 848(q)(4)(B) is commenced by the filing of a death row defendant's
motion requesting the appointment of counsel for his federal habeas corpus
proceeding." 99 After the defendant requests appointment of counsel, habeas
proceedings have commenced, thereby allowing a court to appoint counsel.
Professors Hertz and Liebman adopt the rationale of McFarland to
propose that courts redetermine when an "application" for habeas review occurs

federal habeas proceedings have commenced and that the defendant's motion did not constitute
a petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 853. The Supreme Court reasoned that if counsel can only
be appointed after the habeas petition is filed the statutory grant of counsel is defeated. Id. at
855. Instead, for § 848(q) to be meaningful, counsel must assist in the preparation and filing of
the habeas petition. Id. at 855-57. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court, finding that
a request for appointment of counsel under § 848(q) constitutes commencement of habeas
proceedings, thus permitting counsel to be appointed. 1d. at 856-57. The Court stated that its
interpretation was necessary to protect the meaningful grant of assistance of counsel in § 848(q).
Id. Furthermore, the Court found that the defendant's request for counsel also granted
jurisdiction to the district court, enabling it to grant a stay of execution even though a formal
habeas petition had not been filed. Id. at 858.
94. See id. at 851 (stating the issue).
95. See id. at 852 (noting that defendant filed a motion seeking habeas relief but never
filed a proper habeas petition).
96. See id. at 855-57 (finding that the request for counsel did commence the
proceedings).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000).
98. See McFarland,512 U.S. at 856 (finding that Congress did not intend to defeat the
purpose of § 848(q)).
99. Id. at 856-57.
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in capital cases.'0°
McFarland created a special exception for capital
defendants to protect the substance of the statutory grant of counsel. Because
the AEDPA was legislated into the backdrop of existing habeas case law, Hertz
and Liebman argue that McFarland still governs when capital habeas
proceedings commence.' 01 Courts could rely on McFarland to find that
commencement of capital habeas proceedings under McFarland also
constitutes an "application" under § 2244.102 This exception for capital
petitioners would serve substantially the same purpose as the exception in
McFarland-guaranteeing that diligent petitioners receive the statutory
promise of counsel.
Although the argument by Hertz and Liebman certainly has appeal, it
creates problems of its own. In McFarland,the Court could redefine the
commencement of habeas proceedings because the redefinition did not conflict
with any other applicable statutory language. In the AEDPA, however, the
word "application" has a specific statutory meaning. Under § 2242, an
application is a "writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is
intended.' 0 3 The statutory definition also sets pleading requirements for the
application: "It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or
detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of
what claim or authority, if known."' °4 Clearly, a McFarlandmotion, which
merely asks for appointment of counsel, does not come close to meeting the
technical requirements set forth in § 2242.
A finding that a McFarlandmotion constitutes an application for purposes
of§ 2244 would conflict with the word's statutory definition and put § 2244 at
odds with the rest of the AEDPA.' °5 Courts are unlikely to accept such a
100. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 5.2b, at 267-69 (applying McFarlandto
the language the AEDPA).
101. See id. (stating that Congress legislated against the backdrop of McFarland).
102. See id. (arguing that the McFarlandrule should apply to the AEDPA and, therefore,
the filing of a request for appointment of counsel satisfies the AEDPA statute of limitations).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000); see also Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1245 (1Ith Cir.
2002) (deciding whether the AEDPA governed a case where the defendant filed a McFarland
motion prior to the AEDPA's enactment but did not file the actual habeas petition until after
enactment). The Isaacs court ultimately decided that a McFarlandmotion is not an application
for purposes of § 2254. Id. "[T]he filing of a motion for appointment of counsel or other
threshold motions might initiate some form of 'case,' at least in the constitutional sense.
However, such a motion does not necessarily mark the genesis of the habeas case under
§ 2254." Id.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000).
105. SeeBrown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118(1994) (notingthat "there is apresumption
that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute"). But see Yackle, supra
note 60, at 381-82 (stating that courts should interpret the language of the AEDPA using the
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redefinition. 106 Moreover, if a request for appointment of counsel was found to
satisfy the statute of limitations, the attorney would no longer have an incentive
to move quickly and file the actual habeas petition. Without the pressing
statute of limitations, federal habeas corpus would soon be plagued by the same
stalling tactics Congress sought to prevent through enactment of the AEDPA.
Thus, although McFarland still applies to determine when a court has
jurisdiction to appoint an attorney under § 848(q), the case is unlikely to dictate
07
when an application for a writ of habeas corpus occurs.1

same flexibility and creativity that the Court exercised in McFarland). Although Professor
Yackle does not necessarily endorse the result advocated by Hertz and Liebman-that courts
treat a McFarlandmotion as an application for habeas corpus-he does suggest that courts use
the same solution-oriented approach to statutory construction. Id. To redefine a term contrary
to its statutory definition, however, exceeds the bounds ofjudicial creativity.
106. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 208-10 (2003) (discussing whether a
McFarlandmotion constituted an "application for a writ of habeas corpus" for purposes of
determining whether habeas proceedings were pending when the AEDPA was enacted). The
Woodford Court found that a McFarlandmotion did not qualify as an "application for a writ of
habeas corpus" in these circumstances. Id. Although the Court did not address whether
McFarland applies for purposes of § 2244(d), the Court's reasoning suggests that the
McFarlandmotion would not satisfy the statute of limitations. See id. at 208-09 (noting that
McFarland'sreasoning applied to § 2251, not § 2254); see also Moseley v. French, 961 F.
Supp. 889, 893 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (discussing whether filing a McFarland motion for
appointment of counsel satisfies the AEDPA statute of limitations). The Moseley court rejected
the suggestion that, under McFarland,the court should deem the statute of limitations satisfied
by the request for counsel. Id. The court explained that the motion commenced habeas
proceedings only for purposes of§ 848(q) and not § 2244. Id. Therefore, the defendant was
still required to file a formal petition to meet the deadline. Id. The court noted, however, that
while the McFarlandmotion did not by itself satisfy the statute of limitations, it could justify
equitable tolling if appointed counsel failed to file in a timely manner. Id.
107. Other commentators have suggested that the time between filing a McFarlandmotion
and the subsequent appointment of counsel should automatically equitably toll the statute of
limitations. See Woolley, supra note 69, at 430-31 (stating that McFarlandrequires courts to
equitably toll the AEDPA statute of limitations after a petitioner requests counsel). This
approach is far more promising, considering the uniformity of language issues created by the
Hertz and Liebman approach. See also supra note 85 (noting that both the Powell Committee
and the American Bar Association recommended tolling the statute of limitations for any period
in which the defendant was not represented by counsel). Reading McFarlandin light of the
Powell Committee recommendations, which were extremely influential in drafting the AEDPA,
courts could determine that any period prior to appointment of counsel should be equitably
tolled. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing
the availability of equitable tolling under the AEDPA). Justice Stevens noted that "a federal
court might very well conclude that tolling is appropriate based on the reasonable belief that
Congress could not have intended to bar federal habeas review for petitioners who invoke the
court's jurisdiction within the I-year interval prescribed by AEDPA." Id.
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IV. Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA's Limitations Period
A. The Doctrine
Although McFarlandmay not provide the key to ensuring that capital habeas
petitioners receive meaningful access to habeas corpus, equitable doctrines may
offer such a solution. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to toll a
statutory deadline when, for reasons of fundamental fairness, it would be unjust to
apply the statute of limitations rigidly. 08 Originally, English courts of equity
created the doctrine of equitable tolling to ensure that parties could not profit from
their own fraud.'°9 Modem courts, however, apply the doctrine to a broader set of
facts. Courts may equitably toll a statute of limitations when some external obstacle
prevents a party from meeting the strict requirements of a statute of limitations
despite diligent efforts.1 0 Although the equitable tolling doctrine is not a judicial
license to ignore a congressional statute of limitations,"' it does permit courts to
correct the injustices occasionally engendered by statutes of limitation.
Every court to address the issue has determined that the AEDPA's deadline is
2
a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling." 1 Federal courts have exercised
their power to equitably toll the AEDPA deadline for numerous reasons, including
3
failure by prison officials to mail a defendant's petition," the defendant's mental
incompetence," 4 the defendant's showing of"actual innocence,"' ' and misconduct
108. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (explaining the purpose
of equitable tolling).
109. See Mark A. Wilner, Note, Justice at the Margins: Equitable Tolling of Washington's
Deadlinefor Filing CollateralAttacks on Criminal Judgments, 75 WASH. L. REv. 675, 684
(2000) (discussing the origins of equitable tolling). The author points to an example where a
defendant concealed a fraudulent bond transaction for nine years, then unsuccessfully asserted
as a defense that the statute of limitations had passed. Id. (citing Booth v. Earl of Warrington, 2
Eng. Rep. 111, 111-13 (1714)).
110. See Doran, supra note 24, at 682-83 (describing generally the requirements of
equitable tolling).
Ill. See Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2002) ("At the margins,
all statutes of limitations and filing deadlines appear arbitrary.").
112. See Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding a statute of
limitations and not ajurisdictional bar); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding the AEDPA's one-year period to be a statute of limitations that can be equitably tolled
and noting agreement in the other circuits to address the issue); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976,
978 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); see also Doran, supra note 24, at 684-86 (discussing the
distinction between statutes of limitation, which are subject to equitable tolling, and
jurisdictional bars, which are not).
113. See Stillman v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the prison
mailbox rule to count the defendant's petition as filed at the time he delivered it to prison
officials for mailing).
114. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Where a habeas
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or concealment of evidence by the state."16 Most federal circuits use an
"extraordinary circumstances" test to determine if the defendant
is entitled to
equitable tolling. "7 Under this test, courts will generally equitably toll the AEDPA
statute when the defendant presents: (1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond
the defendant's control or external to the defendant's own conduct, (3) that
prevented him from filing on time. 1 ' Application of the extraordinary
circumstances test begs the question: What circumstances should be deemed
"extraordinary"?
In noncapital cases, courts universally agree that "garden variety" attorney
negligence does not constitute the extraordinary circumstances necessary to trigger
equitable tolling." 9
Courts describe garden variety error to include
petitioner's mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet the AEDPA filing
deadline,.., the deadline should be equitably tolled.").
115. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that equitable
tolling would be appropriate if a defendant is actually innocent). See generally Jake Sussman,
Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an "ActualInnocence" Exception to AEDPA 's Statute of
Limitations,27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343 (2001); Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual
Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal
Habeas Corpus Petitions,90 CAL. L. REv. 2101 (2002).
116. See Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2000) (equitably tolling
statute when prison officials confiscated the petitioner's papers, which prevented him from
filing); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2000) (stating that the statute of limitations shall
not begin to run until any state-created impediments to filing are removed).
117. See Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808 (applying extraordinary circumstances test); Smith v.
McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Miller v. N.J. State Dep't of Corrs., 145 F.3d
616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (same). But see Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1009-10 (6th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting the extraordinary circumstances test for a different, though reasonably
equivalent, test).
118. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining the
requirements for equitable tolling), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004). The courts of appeals
are divided on the proper standard of review over a lower court's decision concerning equitable
tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. See id. at 247-48 (describing the various standards
used by the circuit courts). While some courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard,
most courts appear to review the lower court's decision de novo, particularly when the
underlying facts are not in dispute. Compare Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir.
2002) (reviewing for abuse of discretion), Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2001)
(same), and Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (same), with Rouse,
339 F.3d at 248 (reviewing de novo), Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same), Helton v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11 th Cir. 2001) (same),
Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1007 n.2 (same), and Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999)
(same).
119. See, e.g., Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that attorney
error, including miscalculation of a statute of limitations, does not rise to extraordinary
circumstances); Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Ineffective assistance of
counsel generally does not warrant equitable tolling."); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 683
(5th Cir. 2002) (stating that miscalculation of the AEDPA statute of limitations does not warrant
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120
inadequate research, 12231
misinterpretation of the statutory tolling provisions,
122
attorney oversight.'
miscalculation of the filing deadline, and other types of minor

Numerous courts of appeals have accordingly refused to toll the statute of limitations
in noncapital cases when, through minor oversight or miscalculation of the deadline, a
defendant seeks to file a habeas petition just a few days after the statute of limitations
expires. 124 The defendant would not term this oversight as minor or garden variety
because he loses access to federal habeas review, but courts have not recognized minor
25
attorney error as an extraordinary circumstance in a noncapital case.

B. Equitable Tolling in the CapitalContext
1. StrictAdherence to the ExtraordinaryCircumstances Test

Untimely habeas petitions from capital defendants present additional challenges
to federal courts. The harsh consequence of losing federal postconviction review is
substantially magnified in capital cases, where defendants are not likely to receive any

equitable tolling).
120. See Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to toll when the
defendant's attorney misinterpreted the statutory tolling provisions).
121. See Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to equitably toll the
statute when the defendant missed the deadline due to his attorney's inadequate research).
122. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (refusing to toll statute
when the defendant's attorney simply miscalculated the deadline in a noncapital case).
123. See, e.g., Geraci, 211 F.3d at 9 (refusing to toll statute when attorney received late
notice of a denial of pending state petition that statutorily tolled deadline).
124. See id. (noting that the petition was only a few days late). For a remarkable noncapital
case where the court refused to equitably toll the statute for minor attorney error, see Sandvik v.
United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). In Sandvik, the defendant's
attorney mailed out the petition by regular mail five days before the AEDPA deadline expired.
Id. at 1270. The petition did not arrive at the clerk's office until one day after the deadline. Id.
The court explained that the attorney should have mailed the petition from Atlanta by private
delivery service or courier rather than by regular mail to ensure that it reached the destination in
Miami in less than a week. Id. at 1272. This type of attorney oversight did not warrant
equitable tolling, and the court dismissed the defendant's petition as untimely, thus precluding
the defendant from receiving federal habeas corpus review. Id.
125. In some exceptional instances, courts have found egregious attorney error to constitute
extraordinary circumstances, even in noncapital cases. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800
(9th Cir. 2003) ("Though ordinary attorney negligence will notjustify equitable tolling, we have
acknowledged that where an attorney's misconduct is sufficiently egregious, it may constitute an
'extraordinary circumstance' warranting equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations.");
Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that attorney
behavior far outside the range of ordinary performance can qualify as extraordinary
circumstances and thus warrant equitable tolling).
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further review before execution.126 These cases raise questions about whether equity
requires a more nuanced standard for equitable tolling to ensure capital defendants
receive federal review on the merits of their claims. The federal circuits that have
addressed the issue of treating capital cases differently for equitable tolling have
reached different conclusions.
In Rouse v. Lee,27 the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the imposition of
a capital sentence affects the equitable tolling analysis.128 The defendant, who
was sentenced to death, presented a colorable claim of jury misconduct in his
initial federal habeas petition. 129 His appointed habeas attorney erroneously
believed that the mailbox rule applied to extend the deadline, and thus filed the
habeas petition one day after the deadline passed. 3 Noting the expiration of
126. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In a capital case such as this,
the consequences of error are terminal, and we therefore pay particular attention to whether
principles of 'equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair' .... "); see
also supra Part II.B (discussing the importance of federal habeas review for state capital
convictions).
127. Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605
(2004). In Rouse, the court addressed whether the sentence imposed affects the extraordinary
circumstances test. Id. at 251. Rouse's attorney filed his federal habeas petition one day past
the deadline. Id. at 244. As an initial matter, the court found that regardless of whether
defendant was one day, one month, or one year late, the statute of limitations had expired. Id.
The court then determined that attorney error, which is attributable to the defendant through
principles of agency law, caused the petition to be filed late. Id. at 249. Therefore, the
defendant failed to provide extraordinary circumstances external to his own conduct to warrant
equitable tolling. Id. at 249-5 1. The court refused to apply a more lenient test because of the
capital nature of the case. Id. at 256. In holding the defendant's habeas petition untimely, this
en banc decision overturned a previous ruling in the case by a panel of Fourth Circuit judges,
which had held that a more lenient standard should apply to equitably toll the AEDPA deadline
in capital cases. See Rouse v. Lee, 314 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding the trial court's
denial of equitable tolling "unconscionable" because the attorney's minor procedural error
barred all federal review in capital case), rev'd en banc, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003). For a
complete discussion of the facts of the case, see generally Jessie A. Seiden & Priya I. Nath, Case
Note, Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003), 16 CAP. DEF. J. 179 (2003).
128. See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 251 (finding that the sentence imposed is irrelevant to
postconviction proceedings).
129. See id. at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting) (stating the allegations of constitutional violations
in the habeas petition). After Rouse's direct appeal was denied, ajuror admitted to concealing
information during voir dire. Id. Thejuror hid his racist views and provided evasive answers in
order to stay on the jury that convicted Rouse. 1d.
130. See id. at 244 (describing the one day delay). After taking into account statutory
tolling, Rouse's one-year statute of limitations period expired on February 5, 2000. Id. Because
this was a Saturday, the petition became due the following Monday, on February 7, 2000. Id.
Rouse's lawyers, interpreting facially applicable federal rules of civil procedure, relied on the
mailbox rule in the belief that the petition could be filed up to three days after the February 7
deadline. Id. at 245. The magistrate dismissed the petition, which was filed on February 8,
2000, as untimely. Id. at 244.
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the AEDPA's statute of limitations, the federal district judge dismissed the
finding that the statute of
petition as untimely. 3' The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
32
limitations barred the habeas corpus review. 1
In refusing to equitably toll the statute, the Fourth Circuit stated that courts
should not consider the merits of the petition, the length of the delay, or the
presence of a capital sentence when deciding to equitably toll the statute of
limitations. 133 Instead, the court looked solely to the reason for the delayattorney oversight. 34 Finding that miscalculation of the statute of limitations
does not constitute extraordinary circumstances as a matter of law, the court's
equitable tolling analysis was complete. 35 The gravity of the sentence imposed
was irrelevant.
The court rejected the suggestion that a different test should apply in
capital cases. 136 Instead, the Rouse court interpreted Supreme Court case law to
find that the "death is different" line of cases only operate to guarantee greater
protections for capital defendants during the trial and sentencing phases.' 37 The
court thus determined that no basis existed to afford capital defendants3 8 any
greater protections than noncapital defendants during collateral review.
Considering the facially strong constitutional claim ofjury bias in Rouse's
petition and the mere one-day delay in filing, it is difficult to imagine any more
compelling facts that could cause the Fourth Circuit to reconsider its holding in
Rouse. Therefore, after Rouse, a defendant presenting a colorable claim of a
constitutionally invalid death sentence in the Fourth Circuit may be denied
federal postconviction relief altogether because 1a39 court-appointed attorney
negligently filed the habeas petition one day late.
131. See id. at 243-44 (explaining the procedural stance of the case).
132. See id. at 257 (affirming the district court).
133. See id. at 248-51 (determining that the merits of the petition and the sentence imposed
play no part in whether extraordinary circumstances beyond the defendant's control prevented
him from filing the habeas petition on time).
134. See id. at 253 (looking only at the reason for the delay to deny equitable tolling).
135. See id. at 251 (refusing to toll the statute of limitations). The Court refused to apply a
less stringent standard for equitable tolling because of the capital sentence. Id. at 256.
136. See id. (refusing to grant extra protections to capital defendants in federal habeas
review).
137. See id. at 254-55 (limiting extra protections for capital defendants to trial and
sentencing phases).
138. See id. (refusing to extend extra protections for capital defendants to habeas
petitioners).
139. Furthermore, because the defendant necessarily exhausted all his opportunities for
state postconviction relief, the denial of federal habeas review all but guarantees that the
defendant's claim of constitutional error will not receive any later consideration at all.
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2. Death Is Different
Not all courts follow the Fourth Circuit's inflexible, formalistic
application of the extraordinary circumstances test in capital cases. The Third
Circuit took a different approach in Fahy v. Horn. 40 The Fahy court relied
heavily on the capital nature of the case to equitably toll the AEDPA, allowing
consideration of an otherwise untimely habeas petition. The court noted:
If the limitation period is not tolled in this case, Fahy will be denied all
federal review of his claims.... Because the consequences are so grave
and the applicable law is so confounding and unsettled, we must allow less
than "extraordinary" circumstances to trigger equitable tolling of the
AEDPA's statute of limitations when a petitioner has been diligent in
assertnA4 his or her claims and rigid application of the statute would be
unfair.'

In refusing to apply the extraordinary circumstances test, the Fahy court
recognized that the irrevocability of a death sentence required additional
safeguards, including greater access to federal habeas review. 142 Denying the
possibility of habeas corpus to a defendant facing the death penalty, according
to the Fahy court, is too harsh a consequence for minor procedural errors
committed under inordinately confusing federal and state law. 143 Instead,
capital defendants that diligently and reasonably pursue their claims can receive
federal review of the merits of a habeas petition.144
140. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply the
extraordinary circumstances test to capital defendants who diligently pursue their claims). In
Fahy, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 242.
Due to confusion about whether state proceedings were pending, his attorney filed the federal
habeas petition over two years after the AEDPA deadline expiredjust six days before he was to
be executed. Id. at 242. Although the defendant pursued his postconviction remedies with
diligence, state law regarding whether the defendant had exhausted all of his state claims was
unclear. Id. at 245. Because of the confusing state procedural requirements, Fahy had a
reasonable belief that a federal habeas petition under § 2254 would be dismissed as
unexhausted. Id. The court found that the evil sought to be protected by the AEDPA-abuse of
the habeas system producing long delays in capital cases-was not present in this case because
the defendant pursued his remedies diligently. Id. The court upheld the lower court's decision
to equitably toll the statute, stating that death penalty cases require greater leniency than
noncapital habeas petitions. Id. at 244-45. The court refused to apply the extraordinary
circumstances test. Id.
141. Id. at 245.
142. See id. (rejecting the extraordinary circumstances test for capital cases).
143. See id. (noting that Fahy's interpretation of the law was reasonable, though ultimately
incorrect).
144. See id.(requiring that capital defendants be diligent and reasonable in pursuit of their
remedies to qualify for the relaxed equitable tolling standard). The Supreme Court appears
poised to resolve the issue of whether reasonably diligent defendants should be entitled to
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3. The Middle Ground
Although the Fourth Circuit and the Third Circuit stand at opposite ends
of the spectrum on this issue of equitable tolling in capital habeas cases, the
remaining circuits fall somewhere in the middle. The Ninth Circuit appears to
side with the Third Circuit, granting greater leniency to capital defendants in
claims for equitable tolling. 145 Although the Ninth Circuit nominally applies an
extraordinary circumstances test in all requests for equitable tolling regardless
of the sentence imposed, the standards are more relaxed in application for
capital cases. In particular, attorney error that would not ordinarily rise to the
level of extraordinary circumstances can trigger equitable tolling in capital
cases. 146 Other circuits addressing equitable tolling in capital cases have not
explicitly 47granted any weight to the sentence in their equitable tolling
analyses. 1
V, DistinguishingCapitalCasesfor Equitable Tolling
A. Defining the Purpose of the AEDPA
The AEDPA does not dictate how courts should apply the equitable tolling
doctrine. It is clear, however, that application of equitable tolling should not be

equitable tolling of the AEDPA. See Pace v. Vaughn, No. 02-3049, 71 Fed. Appx. 127 (3d Cir.
July 7, 2003) (addressing the availability of equitable tolling to a diligent defendant), cert.
granted sub nora. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 73 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 039627). Although the equitable tolling issue in Pace arises in a noncapital case, the Court will
apparently address one of the more general questions presented in the petition for certiorari:
"Should this Court grant the writ and review the Third Circuit's denial of equitable tolling,
where the Third Circuit denies all federal habeas review to petitioners who act appropriately,
reasonably and diligently, and as demanded by the exhaustion requirement, in seeking state
court remedies?" The broad language in this question is not limited to the noncapital context,
and the Court could resolve broader questions about the relevance of equitable tolling to federal
habeas procedures.
145. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1289(9th Cir. 1997)
(tolling statute when defendant's attorney withdrew in the middle of the capital case, leaving
unusable work product).
146. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that capital cases
provide an exception to the general rule that ordinary attorney error does not warrant equitable
tolling of the AEDPA deadline).
147. See Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that attorney error
did not equitably toll statute in capital case); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460,463 (8th Cir.
2000) (dismissing an untimely habeas petition without according any weight to the capital
sentence).
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utilized to defeat the purpose of the AEDPA's statute of limitations.148 Courts
exercise their power to equitably toll a statute in order to overcome injustice,
not to undermine legislation. To determine how equitable tolling relates to the
purpose of the AEDPA statute of limitations, a court must first establish the
purpose of the legislation.
The Fahy court determined that equitable tolling did not conflict with the
AEDPA's purpose, which was to prevent delays in state convictions resulting
from abusive use of the federal habeas system. 149 The defendant in Fahy
diligently asserted his claims in a reasonable manner, 50 but the exceedingly
confusing procedural mechanisms of state law and the AEDPA tripped him
up.' 5 ' By defining the purpose of the AEDPA as prevention of abusive delays
in the habeas system, the court was not bound to formalistically bar every
untimely habeas petition, only abusive delays. The court could inquire into the
presence of any abusive purpose behind the delay in filing. Finding no
52
equitably tolling the statute presented no real
evidence of abuse in Fahy,1
conflict with the AEDPA's purpose.
Contrasting Rouse with Fahy, it is clear that a court's definition of the
AEDPA's primary purpose greatly shapes the resulting equitable tolling
analysis.153 In Rouse, the court found Congress's primary goal in enacting the
AEDPA to be promotion of efficiency in capital cases. 54 Therefore, any
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations directly frustrates Congress's
express intent of avoiding delay and should be used only in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. 155 In Fahy, the court's determination that the
AEDPA's primary purpose was to curb abuse of the habeas system allowed
greater judicial discretion in providing relief. The Fahy court thus had
148. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the need for limited
invocation of the equitable tolling doctrine).
149. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239,245 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting the lack of any evidence
suggesting that the defendant abused the habeas system).
150. See id. (stating that the defendant diligently asserted his claims).
15 1. See id. (describing the relevant state law as "opaque").
152. See id. (remarking on the lack of abusive purpose behind the defendant's late habeas
petition).
153. See generally Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A
Practitioner'sGuide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation,35 AKRON L. REV. 451
(2002) (discussing the difficulties of determining a clear statement of legislative purpose).
154. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing the
purpose of the AEDPA), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004).
155. See id. (stating that courts may not create ad hoc alterations to a statutory limitation
that Congress found to accommodate the interests involved) (citing Lonchar v. Thomas, 517
U.S. 314, 327-28 (1996)).
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flexibility to act as equity required, placing the need to guard against
constitutional
violations ahead of Congress's legitimate concerns over
56
1
efficiency.
Reducing the legislative purpose of comprehensive legislation such as the
AEDPA to one particular goal is clearly an oversimplification. However, this
oversimplification, as is made clear by comparing Fahy and Rouse, is not
without analytical value. Considering the background to the AEDPA, defining
the purpose of the legislation as prevention of abuse appears to more accurately
encompass the AEDPA's goals. 5 7 This definition of legislative purpose then
allows courts the "wiggle room" to consider the full spectrum of issues
confronting them.' Under circumstances where no abuse is present, courts
may then exercise their equitable powers without concern of frustrating
Congress's direct purpose. Moreover, as the next section of this Note
highlights, the overarching purpose of the AEDPA suggests that broad use of
equitable tolling for diligent capital defendants is fundamental to the AEDPA's
scheme.' 59 Even if other circuits refuse to adopt Fahy's lower standard for
equitable tolling in capital habeas cases, persuasive reasons exist for equitably
tolling the AEDPA deadline under the widely used extraordinary circumstances
test under facts identical to those in Rouse v. Lee.
B. Basisfor Special Treatment of Capital Cases
The Rouse court stated that the "death is different" cases apply only to
160
guarantee extra procedural safeguards at the trial level and direct appeal.
156. See Fahy, 240 F.3d at 245 ("We elect to exercise this leniency under the facts of this
capital case where there is no evidence of abuse of the process.").
157. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
924, 944 (stating that the AEDPA "sets a one year limitation on an application for a habeas
writ" in order to "curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute
problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases"); H.R. REP. No. 104-23, at 9 (1995)
("[T]he bill is designed to reduce the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed and
repetitive filings.").
158. As Justice Frankfurter noted long before passage of the AEDPA:
The meritorious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those few
claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities. The complexities of our
federalism and the workings of a scheme of government involving the interplay of
two governments, one of which is subject to limitations enforceable by the other,
are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules which, by avoiding some abuses,
generate others.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
159. See infra Part V.B (discussing the AEDPA's tradeoff between efficiency and fairness).
160. See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 254 (stating that the "death is different" cases do not apply to
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Thus, the court concluded, there was no basis for treating capital habeas
petitions differently for purposes of equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations.' 6' However, persuasive reasons do exist for providing special
treatment to capital defendants in federal habeas review. Regardless of whether
the death is different cases apply to postconviction procedures, which is
disputable in itself, 62 the court's error lies in its failure to acknowledge the
overriding purpose of the AEDPA legislation. The statutory scheme of the
ample basis for distinguishing capital cases during federal
AEDPA provides
63
habeas review.
Throughout the AEDPA, capital habeas cases are singled out for special
treatment. In fact, one of the primary innovations of the AEDPA is the addition
of Chapter 154 to the Judicial Code, entitled "Special Habeas Corpus
Procedures in Capital Cases."' 64 Broadly stated, the AEDPA overwhelmingly
manifests Congress's goal of ensuring that capital habeas petitioners receive
competent counsel throughout habeas review. Providing meaningful access to
counsel is fundamental to the AEDPA's tradeoff between efficient resolution of
capital cases and ensuring the absolute constitutionality of state capital

collateral review).
161. See id. at 256 (stating that the capital sentence should not affect the equitable tolling
analysis).
162. Although the Supreme Court stated in the past that the death is different cases do not
apply to collateral review, Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) (rejecting the
suggestion that capital sentences require a different standard of review on federal habeas
corpus), the Supreme Court has acted to provide extra procedural safeguards in federal habeas.
See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856-57 (1994) (creating an exception that deemed a
capital defendant's habeas petition to be commenced when the defendant requested appointment
of counsel). After McFarland,contrary to the Court's claim, capital and noncapital habeas
petitioners do receive different treatment for federal habeas review. See Kappler, supranote 71,
at 569-70 (discussing how McFarlandmarks adeparture from the Supreme Court decisions that
limit the death is different cases to trial and direct appeal).
163. Empirical evidence suggests that federal courts clearly do, in fact, accord special
treatment to capital defendants in federal habeas review. See Mello, supra note 55, at 520-21
(noting that capital habeas petitions have a success rate of over 70% in federal courts, while
noncapital habeas petitions are successful only about 3% of time in the same courts). The
disparity between the success rates of capital and noncapital petitions shows that federal courts
take pains to ensure the constitutionality of state-imposed capital sentences. See Murray, 492
U.S. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Professor Mello's article for the principle that
federal courts treat capital defendants differently in habeas corpus proceedings). Justice
Stevens, joined in his Murray dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blacknun, noted that
federal courts treat capital habeas petitions as ameaningful extension of direct appeal, providing
another level of review to guarantee the integrity of the capital sentence. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
164. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2000) (delineating the "opt-in provisions" of Chapter 154).
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convictions. 165 It is the AEPDA's promise of counsel to capital defendants that
provides the jumping-off point for courts to recognize a special distinction
between capital and noncapital habeas petitioners for purposes of equitably
tolling the statute of limitations for attorney error.
Incorporating the recommendations of the Powell Committee,166 Chapter
154 creates special procedures for capital cases to expedite habeas review for
defendants from states that comply with Chapter 154's broad appointment of
counsel requirements. 167 By providing competent counsel throughout state
postconviction proceedings, states can opt into the AEDPA's special procedural
system for capital defendants during federal habeas. The opt-in procedures
16
evidence a strong preference for reviewing the habeas claim on its merits. 1
Section 2263 permits a court to toll the statute of limitations at any time for
thirty days for "good cause." 169 The bargain between efficiency and protection
foreseen by the drafters of Chapter 154, however, has gone unrealized. Of the
thirty-eight states authorizing the death penalty, only Arizona has officially
opted into Chapter 154 of the AEDPA. 70
Although Chapter 154 is not controlling for defendants from states that
have not opted in, the idea of a bargain between efficiency and adequate
representation resonates equally throughout the non-opt-in provisions. Section
848(q) of Title 21 guarantees that every defendant facing a capital sentence
165. See POWELL COMMITTEE, supranote 16, at 6 ("Capital cases should be subject to one
complete and fair course of collateral review in the state and federal system, free from the time
pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for the
defendant.").
166. See id. at 5-7 (proposing new federal habeas procedures that would apply only to
capital habeas petitioners).
167. The procedures in Chapter 154 are generally called the "opt-in" procedures. States
can opt into the expedited federal review process by complying with the statutory requirements
of Chapter 154.
168. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206-07 (2003) (discussing the AEDPA's
focus on addressing the merits of habeas claims).
169. The problem of attorney miscalculation of the AEDPA deadline is partly ameliorated
under Chapter 154. While a defendant in a non-opt-in state will normally be precluded from
federal habeas corpus if his attorney files the petition one day late, defendants in opt-in states
may still be able to receive review after the deadline. Section 2263(b)(3)(B) expressly allows
courts to equitably toll the Chapter 154 statute of limitations for up to thirty days if "good
cause" is shown. However, because states have not opted into Chapter 154, courts have had no
opportunity to interpret the language of Section 2263(b)(3)(B). Thus, it remains to be seen
whether the good cause standard is the same as extraordinary circumstances, or whether an
attorney's late filing would constitute good cause in the opt-in procedures.
170. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Arizona's
procedures to qualify for Chapter 154 treatment); see also McConville, supra note 71, at 62-63
(discussing the effect of the opt-in provisions, including the levels of state compliance).
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shall have the right to representation by counsel during federal habeas
proceedings.'17 The AEDPA expressly retained this guarantee of counsel for
72
capital defendants that proceed in non-opt-in states.' Much like in Chapter
154, defendants must rely on the promise of adequate counsel to
counterbalance the difficulties caused by imposition of a one-year statute of
limitations.
In Frye v. Hickman, 7 3 the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the careful balance
74
Because capital
created by the AEDPA scheme for capital defendants.'
defendants are entitled to counsel, the Fryecourt noted, an appointed attorney's
failure to file the habeas petition before expiration of the AEDPA's statute of
limitations should not automatically preclude the defendant from receiving
federal habeas review. 175 Although ordinary attorney error does not warrant
equitable tolling in noncapital cases, the guarantee of counsel to capital
defendants are entitled
defendants through Section 848(q) suggests that capital
counsel.' 76
appointed
by
error
from
relief
to equitable
As the Frye court recognized, when appointed counsel, through his own
error, causes the defendant to miss the filing deadline, the statutory grant of
counsel in Section 848(q) is deprived of any substance. This illusory grant of
171. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that capital defendants shall receive
counsel in all habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255).
172. In 1996, the AEDPA altered the language of § 848(q) while purposely leaving intact
the guarantee of counsel to indigent habeas petitioners seeking review of state capital sentences.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2000) (expressly retaining the guarantee of counsel for indigent
capital habeas defendants provided for in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)).
173. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). In Frye, the court decided whether
the defendant was entitled to equitable tolling after his attorney miscalculated the statute of
limitations. Id. at 1145. After taking into account any statutory tolling, the defendant's federal
habeas petition was filed seventy-eight days after the expiration the AEDPA's statute of
limitations. Id. at 1146. The defendant could only receive habeas review, therefore, if the court
equitably tolled the statute to accommodate the delay. The defendant missed the deadline
because his appointed attorney failed to file within the statute of limitations. Id. Because this
was not a capital case, the defendant was not entitled to counsel by statute or the Constitution.
Id. The court distinguished Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283
(9th Cir. 1997), which equitably tolled the statute because of attorney neglect, on the grounds
that Beeler was a capital case. Id. "In capital cases, an indigent petitioner has a statutory right
to counsel. Thus, the dereliction of his appointed counsel made it impossible for the petitioner
to file the petition he was statutorily entitled to file." Id. (citation omitted). The Frye court
refused to toll the statute. Id.
174. See id. at 1146 (refusing to toll statute in noncapital case but noting that the outcome
in a capital case may be different).
175. See id. (distinguishing capital cases from noncapital cases for purposes of equitably
tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations).
176. See id. (citing Ninth Circuit case law). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(3)(B) (2000)
(allowing equitable tolling for capital defendants in Chapter 154 procedures for "good cause").
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counsel can be extremely detrimental to the defendant's interests. Considering
that the defendant could file the petition without aid of counsel, Section 848(q)
inevitably leads to reliance by the capital defendant on the promise of his
appointed counsel to fulfill the requirements of the AEDPA.177 As shown in
Rouse v. Lee, this misplaced reliance can ultimately defeat any opportunity for
the petitioner to receive federal review if the attorney fails to meet the
requirements of the AEDPA.
By refusing to equitably toll for error by appointed attorney, the court
punishes reliance by indigent petitioners on a federal statutory entitlement to
counsel. An indigent petitioner, no matter how diligent his research into the
AEDPA deadline, will be refused habeas review if his appointed attorney
78
negligently files too late. In other areas of law, such as Miranda1
and the
privilege against self-incrimination,1 7 courts have made very clear that a
defendant may not be punished for relying on a federal entitlement. 8 ° The
same is not true under the AEDPA. By providing a meaningless grant of
counsel, courts effectively dictate that defendants must file their federal habeas
petitions pro se in order to positively ensure timely filing. And if the petitioner
is obligated to personally comply with technical requirements of the AEDPA,
the statutory guarantee of counsel is meaningless."'
The problem of detrimental reliance on an appointed attorney is
minimized in the trial context, of course, because defendants are protected from
irreversible attorney error by the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. 12
177. Capital habeas petitioners may, of course, still choose to file their petitions pro se.
Due to the complexity of the AEDPA and state law, however, a prudent defendant will likely
defer to the purported expertise of an appointed attorney.
178. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976) (discussing the principle that if a
defendant is granted Miranda rights, the prosecution cannot point to the defendant's failure to
speak as evidence of guilt).
179. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (stating the rule that the
prosecution cannot comment on a defendant's decision not to testify in order to draw negative
inferences). These cases illustrate the principle that a defendant cannot fairly be punished for
relying on his rights. Furthermore, Griffin discusses cases that relied on a federal statute
creating the right not to testify rather than the Fifth Amendment to prohibit the prosecution from
commenting. Id. (citing Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1892), Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1946), and Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939)). In the habeas context,
however, the defendant can lose all possibility of access to habeas review because he relied on
his appointed attorney's promise to file by the deadline.
180. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 (stating that using the defendant's reliance on his federal
right to remain silent as evidence of guilt would be "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of
due process").
181. See McConville, supra note 71, at 69 (stating that the "meaningfulness" rule of
statutory construction prohibits courts from voiding a statutory grant of counsel).
182. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (presenting the standard for
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In the habeas context, where defendants have no such right to effective counsel,
their reliance on an appointed attorney's compliance with the AEDPA is an
exercise in risk, and the stakes-losing federal habeas review of a capital
sentence-could not be higher. Recognizing this disparity, courts could
remedy such detrimental reliance through use of the courts' equitable powers.
When the government fails to hold up its side of the bargain in providing
counsel to ensure fairness of postconviction proceedings, equity must step in.
As the Frye court determined, the government's failure to provide adequate
counsel should constitute extraordinary circumstances that caused the
defendant to miss the statute of limitations. Of course, a finding of
extraordinary circumstances does not finally resolve the equitable tolling
analysis. Even if a court finds that attorney error does constitute extraordinary
circumstances, these circumstances must still be external to the defendant's
warrant equitable tolling under the extraordinary
conduct in order 18to
3
test.
circumstances
C. Inapplicabilityof Agency Theory
Despite the apparent inequity in holding a federal habeas petitioner liable
for significant attorney error, courts have generally attributed error vicariously
to the defendant through agency principles. In Rouse, the Fourth Circuit held
the defendant vicariously liable for errors committed by his appointed attorney
in interpreting the AEDPA statute of limitations-thus the attorney error was
not external to the defendant's conduct under the extraordinary circumstances
test. 8 4 Courts addressing the issue have generally agreed, finding defendants to
be strictly and vicariously liable for errors committed by their habeas attorneys
in postconviction procedures. Because a capital habeas defendant's right to
counsel originates in statute' and not the Constitution, habeas petitioners have
8 6 Absent the
no right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.
ineffective trial counsel).
183. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining the elements of the
extraordinary circumstances test).
184. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (attributing attorney
error to the defendant), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004).
185. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (2000) (stating that all defendants facing state capital
punishments are entitled to counsel during federal habeas proceedings).
186. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (remarking that the Supreme Court has yet to hold that indigent capital
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel during federal habeas proceedings).
Blackrnun's statement, while noting that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to indigent
capital defendants, clearly tries to leave the door open that a future decision could extend the
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guidelines of ineffective counsel principles, courts have thus looked to agency
law to analyze the
extent of a defendant's liability for acts of his appointed
87
habeas counsel.
The Rouse court stated the general rule that attorney error falling short of
ineffective assistance of counsel shall be attributed vicariously to the defendant
through principles of agency.188 The cruel irony of this rule in the habeas
context, of course, is that any attorney error will always fall short of ineffective
assistance of counsel because defendants have no right to effective counsel at
this stage. 8 9 In agency law, the extent of a defendant's liability for attorney
error is defined by the scope of the agency relationship. Under general agency
principles, any attorney misconduct or negligence within the scope of the
normal attorney-client relationship would be attributed vicariously to the
defendant. 90 A closer look at the relationship between the capital defendant
and his appointed attorney, however, makes courts' analogies to agency law
untenable.
On a very fundamental level, the imposition of an agency relationship into
the habeas context is artificial and inappropriate. The basis of the traditional
principal-agent relationship stands on the cornerstones of loyalty, consent, and
92
free choice.' 9' As the Supreme Court stated in Link v. WabashRailroadCo.:1
right to counsel to these defendants in the course of federal proceedings. Some commentators
suggest that the Court could find a constitutional right to effective counsel in'the Due Process
Clause. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, §§ 7.2a-e (suggesting that the Supreme Court
could find strong basis for a guarantee of counsel under procedural due process protections, the
meaningful access component of the Due Process Clause, the Suspension Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause).
187. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
particularly egregious attorney error will not be attributed to the defendant and can thus
constitute extraordinary circumstances external to the defendant's conduct); Rouse, 339 F.3d at
250-51 (stating that the statutory grant of counsel is fulfilled unless counsel's acts are so
inadequate that they constitute abandonment and defendant could not be said to have counsel at
all).
188. See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 249-50 (stating the rule).
189. See id. at 250 (stating that the defendant has no right to constitutionally effective
counsel in habeas proceedings).
190. See id. at 250 & n. 14 (relying on traditional agency principles to define the scope of
the defendant's liability for his attorney's negligence).
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.").
192. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). In Link, the Court decided whether
the district court could dismiss a civil suit with prejudice for failure by the plaintiff's attorney to
attend a pretrial conference. Id. at 628-29. The district court, sitting in a diversity suit, invoked
its inherent power to dismiss the suit when the attorney failed to provide a "reasonable reason"
for missing the pretrial conference. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that
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"Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action,
and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this
freely selected agent.' 93 There is no inequity in attributing an attorney's error
to the client when the client has freely selected and retained the attorney-when
a client fully and manifestly consents to the agency relationship, normal agency
rules may fairly be applied. 194
The free choice and consent that form the basis of a traditional agency
relationship are notably lacking in the habeas context. The vast majority of
capital defendants seeking federal habeas review are indigent and, therefore,
entitled only to court-appointed habeas counsel.195 Because of the staggering
time commitment and costs that accompany habeas representation, a ready pool
of qualified habeas attorneys does not exist. 96 Defendants therefore have little
or no free choice concerning their representation. Once the court finds a
willing attorney, that attorney is appointed. 97 These attorneys are often
overburdened and overmatched by the tortuous passages of habeas
procedure.'9 "
Furthermore, once an attorney is found and appointed, the defendant does
not have unilateral authority to dismiss him.' 99 Unless a court agrees to
dismissal with prejudice unfairly punishes the client for error by the attorney. Id. at 633-34.
The Court explained that, because the client freely selected the lawyer to act as his agent, the
basic system of representative litigation required the client to be bound by the lawyer's actions.
Id. at 634. Noting other evidence of delays by the attorney, the Court upheld the dismissal. Id.
at 636.
193. Id. at 633-34; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958) ("An agency
relation exists only if there has been a manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent
may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act.").
194. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981)
("[T]he principal must be shown to have consented to the agency since one cannot be the agent
of another except by consent of the latter.").
195. See Howard, supra note 19, at 902 (noting that habeas petitioners can only rarely
afford to retain their own counsel).
196. See id. (describing the defunding of public postconviction representation and the
corresponding dearth of competent habeas attorneys).
197. See I HERTZ& LIEBMAN, supra note 13, § 12.3a (describing the appointment process).
Although many appointing authorities will favor appointment of an attorney familiar with the
case, if no such attorney is available, the court will simply follow its usual procedures for
appointment from a pool of possible appointees. See id. (discussing courts' procedures for
appointment).
198. See Hammel, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing the problem of inexperienced or
incompetent postconviction counsel).
199. See Hunter v. Delo, 62 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing factors that would
permit substitution of appointed habeas counsel). The Huntercourt explained that, although
habeas petitioners are not entitled to Sixth Amendment effective counsel, the requirements for
substitution of counsel are the same for both appointed habeas counsel and appointed trial
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terminate the representation, the defendant will be represented without his
consent. If the defendant seeks to substitute appointed counsel, the court must
determine whether the defendant has a "justifiable dissatisfaction" with
appointed counsel. 2°° Only if the defendant's request is justifiable and the
substitution will not substantially delay proceedings will the court allow the
defendant to substitute. Furthermore, unlike representation in civil suits where
a represented party provides consideration for the services of an attorney of his
own choosing, the habeas attorney is appointed by the federal government;
consideration for the attorney comes not from the represented party but from
government coffers.2 "
Considering all the interceding obstacles in the relationship between a
habeas petitioner and appointed counsel, attribution of every attorney error
strictly and vicariously to the defendant is a perversion of agency theory.20 2
The defendant's ability to consent to the relationship is so fundamentally
limited that any determination of consent is a stark fiction. The defendant
cannot select his agent; rather, the court appoints it. 20 3 The defendant cannot
terminate the agency; rather, the court must terminate it. 204 The defendant does
not provide consideration to his attorney; rather, the state provides it.20 5 To
attribute the court-appointed attorney's errors to the defendant as in a
20 6
traditional agency relationship is clearly a fallacy.
counsel. See id. ("[W]e believe that substitution-of-counsel standards applied in cases in which
the Sixth Amendment is implicated should apply here as well."). The court also noted that the
petitioner could include specific preferences for his appointed attorney in his motion for
appointment. Id. at 276. The court, however, would not be obligated to honor any specific
request. See id. (stating that the court need not honor the petitioner's requests). The petitioner
clearly lacks any real power to choose his representation during habeas proceedings.
200. See id. at 274 (discussing the basis for granting a request for substitution). The
defendant must present evidence suggesting "a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or
a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant" before a court
will grant the request for new counsel. See id. (quoting United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494,
499 (8th Cir. 1992)) (discussing specific grounds for substitution).
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)( 10) (2000) (authorizing payment to attorneys appointed for
indigent defendants in federal habeas proceedings in capital cases).
202. Cf William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: An ImproperJustificationforHolding Clients Responsiblefor TheirAttorneys'
ProceduralErrors, 1988 DuKE L.J. 733, 753-54 (arguing that agency law is inapplicable to the
attorney-client relationship, even in civil litigation).
203. See Hunter, 62 F.3d at 276 (stating that the court need not accommodate the
defendant's preferences in appointing an attorney).
204. See id. at 274 (discussing when substitution of habeas counsel would be appropriate).
205. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) (2000) (authorizing payment of attorney fees).
206. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (noting that a civil
litigant's ability to freely select his attorney permits a court to fairly attribute attorney
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The unfairness of imposing a traditional agency relationship into the
habeas context is exacerbated by the operation of the AEDPA. The one-year
statute of limitations imposed by the AEDPA effectively guarantees that the
defendant cannot exercise his only real opportunity to "consent" to the agency
relationship--the ability to petition the court for new counsel. The AEDPA
statute does not toll when the defendant is seeking habeas counsel; therefore, if
the court did terminate counsel, the defendant would need to find new counsel
that could be prepared to file the habeas petition before the AEDPA deadline
expires. Considering the complexity and time commitment necessary to
properly mount a collateral attack, the new counsel would be hard pressed to
put together an adequate and complete petition within the remaining time.
In several pre-AEDPA cases, the Supreme Court relied on agency
principles to attribute error by a criminal attorney to the defendant for conduct
that fell below the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Murray v.
Carrier,207 the Court stated that "[s]o long as a defendant is represented by
counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the
standard established in Stricklandv. Washington,2 0 8 we discern no inequity in
misconduct to the client).
207. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). In Murray,the Court considered whether an
attorney's inadvertent failure to raise a claim of error on appeal constituted cause for purposes
of overcoming procedural default. Id. at 481-82. After being convicted of rape and abduction
by a Virginia jury, the defendant's attorney accidentally omitted a substantive claim of
discovery error in the petition for appeal. Id. at 482. This oversight, however, did not rise to
the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 486. To show cause for procedural default,
the defendant must show some obstacle, external to the defense, that caused the default. Id. at
488. The existence of constitutionally ineffective counsel constitutes cause because counsel's
errors are imputed to the state through operation of the Sixth Amendment, making the errors
external to the defendant. Id. If the defendant's right to counsel is not violated, however, that
error is imputed not to the state, but to the defendant. Id. Error by counsel falling short of
ineffective counsel cannot constitute cause because it is not external to the defense. Id.
Although the defendant was entitled to effective assistance of counsel during his appeal of right,
the defendant disavowed any claim of ineffective assistance; therefore, the defendant failed to
establish cause for the default, and the Court rejected his claim. Id. at 497.
208. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (stating the test for violation of
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel). In Strickland,the Supreme Court addressed the
proper standard for determining whether a criminal attorney's behavior was so defective as to
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to effective counsel. Id. at 67 1. After pleading
guilty to three capital murder charges, the defendant was sentenced to death by the trial judge.
Id. at 672. The defendant raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning
the sentencing phase of his trial. Id. at 675. The Court first noted that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is the right to effective counsel. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). The Strickland Court laid out a two-part test to determine
when counsel's performance is so defective as to constitute constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
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requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural
default."20 9 The Court determined that the defendant was therefore entitled to
redress only for error of his counsel that rose to the Strickland level of
ineffective assistance.21 0
Murray does not directly apply to the habeas context, however, because it
involved a defendant who was guaranteed constitutionally effective counsel.
No basic performance safeguards exist in habeas procedures to govern attorney
behavior. The error complained of in Murrayoccurred during the defendant's
appeal of right while the Sixth Amendment still operated to guarantee effective
counsel. 21 Even though the attorney failed to raise one claim on appeal, the
Sixth Amendment still ensured that the defendant would receive a meaningful
appeal of some kind. If the attorney had failed to file the petition of appeal
altogether, for example, the defendant would have been permitted to file an outof-time appeal.21 2 In the habeas context, however, the failure of an appointed
attorney to file a timely habeas petition does not entitle the defendant to file an
out-of-time habeas petition. Instead, the defendant is entirely precluded from
receiving federal review on his claims. Thus, attributing minor trial error to the
defendant through agency principles makes sense in Murray where the
defendant is still guaranteed effective counsel; however, attributing far more
serious error to the defendant in the habeas context, where the defendant has no
basic level of protection, is exceedingly harsh.
A second pre-AEDPA case, Coleman v. Thompson,213 is more relevant
to this discussion. In Coleman, the Supreme Court attributed error by the
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687. Applying its test to the facts, the Court determined that the error complained of was
the result of reasonable professional judgment by the attorney. Id. at 699. Furthermore, any
possible error did not prejudice the defendant. Id. at 700. Under the facts of this case,
therefore, the attorney's behavior was constitutionally effective. Id.
209.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.

210. See id. (stating that attorney error short of ineffective assistance does not constitute
cause).
211. See id. at 497 (noting that the defendant was entitled to effective assistance of counsel
during his appeal of right).
212. See Ferguson v. United States, 699 F.2d 1071, 1072 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A]n
attorney's total failure to file an appeal after being instructed to do so will always entitle the
defendant to an out-of-time appeal, regardless of the defendant's chances of success.").
213. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman, the Court decided whether
the failure of the defendant's state habeas attorney to file a timely appeal from state collateral
proceedings procedurally defaulted the claims for federal habeas review. The attorney filed the
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defendant's state habeas attorney vicariously to the defendant through agency
principles. 14 The defendant's attorney failed to properly file a timely appeal in
state court from initial state collateral proceedings; therefore, the claims were
procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas. 21 5 Although Coleman's
language may suggest that agency rules of vicarious liability should apply
whenever attorney error does not amount to constitutionally ineffective counsel,
Coleman is not dispositive.
Coleman was a pre-AEDPA case discussing a defendant who had no right
to postconviction counsel at all. At the time of the case, capital defendants
seeking postconviction review in Virginia had no statutory right to the
assistance of counsel. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[i]t is
well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding."2 16 Without any guarantee
of counsel, therefore, the attorney-client relationship in Coleman resembled the
attorney-client relationship in any other civil litigation. This traditional agency
relationship, however, is a very different creature than the convoluted attorneyclient relationship in capital federal habeas proceedings. Considering all of the
interceding factors present in the federal appointment process 217 along with the
statutory guarantee of counsel, 2'8 the federal attorney-client relationship in
AEDPA proceedings is clearly distinguishable from the relationship considered
in Coleman.
The Coleman Court explained why attorney error constituting ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be attributed to the defendant: "[I]t is not the
gravity of the attorney's error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of
petitioner's right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external factor,
petition for appeal three days after the state deadline, which precluded the state court from
hearing the appeal. Id. at 727. The Court reaffirmed that attorney error short of ineffective
assistance of counsel does not constitute cause under the cause and prejudice standard. Id. at
754. To constitute cause, the error complained of must be an external factor that impeded the
defendant's efforts to comply with the time requirement. Id. at 753. Unlike error that violates
the defendant's right to counsel, which is imputed to the state and is thus external to the
defendant, error that does not violate a right to counsel is attributed to the defendant through
agency principles. Id. at 753-54. The error complained of was not external to the defendant
and therefore did not constitute cause. Consequently, the defendant's claims were procedurally
defaulted. Id. at 729.
214. See id. at 754 (attributing attorney error to the defendant through principles of agency
law).
215. See id. at 752 (explaining the reason for the default).
216. Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978).
217. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (describing substantial obstacles to
the agency relationship in the habeas context).
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that indigent capital defendants are
entitled to counsel during federal habeas proceedings).
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i.e., 'imputed to the State.' 21 9 In Coleman, the defendant had no right to
counsel, so that right could not be violated. In the AEDPA context, however,
where the defendant does have a right to counsel, -the attorney's error
constitutes a violation of that right to counsel.22 ° Under Coleman, therefore,
the attorney's error in habeas proceedings should be imputed to the government
for the violation of that right to counsel.
The argument for imputing error by appointed postconviction counsel to
the government is bolstered by the conception of the AEDPA as a bargain
between efficiency and fairness in capital habeas proceedings. 22' When the
government's grant of counsel, which acts to counterbalance the difficulties
created by setting a one-year statute of limitations, causes the defendant to miss
the deadline, the bargain of the AEDPA has been defeated. To ensure fair
application of the AEDPA, this error should be imputed to the government.
The extraordinary circumstances test, which most circuits apply for
equitable tolling analysis, requires that the circumstances causing the delay be
external to the defendant's own conduct before the statute may be tolled.222
219. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754. The Coleman Court clearly intended to refer to the Sixth
Amendment when it discussed a "petitioner's right to counsel." For the statutory grant of
counsel of § 848(q) to have any meaning, however, attorney errors that violate this right to
counsel should also be attributed to the state. See McConville, supra note 71, at 80-84 (arguing
that statutory grants of counsel create due process meaningfulness requirements that contain an
effectiveness component).
220. Cf Barrientos v. United States, 668 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1982) (permitting out-oftime appeals for adefendant whose attorney failed to file for an appeal of right). In Barrientos,
the court explained why a defendant should always be granted an out-of-time appeal when his
appointed attorney failed to file in a timely manner:
The basic principles upon which our rule entitling a defendant to an out-of-time
appeal is founded are (1) that every person has an absolute right to an appeal from a
trial court conviction, and (2) that a criminal defendant's right to counsel extends
through the period for taking an appeal. The failure of trial counsel to perfect an
appeal denies a defendant the absolute right to appeal his jury conviction and,
therefore, deprives him of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
Id. (citations omitted). The reasoning in Barrientos translates easily into the habeas context.
Every capital defendant convicted in state court has an absolute right to seek federal habeas
review of preserved, exhausted claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (permitting federal habeas
review), and the right to counsel extends to capital defendants through the period for filing the
habeas petition. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (entitling capital defendants to the right to
counsel during federal habeas proceedings). When counsel's error denies the defendant his
right to receive federal habeas review, the defendant is deprived ofhis statutory right to counsel.
This denial of the defendant's right to counsel should permit defendants to receive out-of-time
habeas review, much as denial of the right to counsel permits defendants to file an out-of-time
appeal.
221. See supra Part V.B (describing the quid pro quo arrangement of the AEDPA where
the guarantee of counsel offsets the new statute of limitations).
222. See, e.g., Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (requiring that
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The attorney error attributed to the government thus satisfies the external
component of the equitable tolling test. Agency principles, therefore, should
not operate to prevent courts from equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of
limitations when the appointed attorney files an untimely petition. Unless
equitable tolling would defeat the purpose of the AEDPA-because, for
instance, the reasons for the delay evidenced abusive disregard for the
deadline-courts can and should equitably toll the AEDPA for attorney error
under the "extraordinary circumstances" test.
VT EnsuringFederalPostconvictionReview for CapitalDefendants
A. A Suggested Approach to Equitable Tolling in CapitalHabeas Cases
Currently, Congress's objectives in the AEDPA are unfulfilled. The
bargain envisioned by Congress between efficiency and constitutional
protection is defeated when appointed counsel fails to properly initiate the
proceedings for which he was appointed. The AEDPA represents Congress's
attempt to prevent abuse of the federal habeas system and to bring fair,
efficient, and final resolution of capital habeas cases.223 Precluding a capital
defendant from receiving federal habeas review because his attorney filed the
petition one day late defeats this purpose.
As described above, the courts of appeals are currently divided regarding
treatment of untimely habeas petitions from capital defendants.224 Unless and
until the Supreme Court resolves this split,225 courts must rely on tools they
already possess to correct the problem of untimely petitions from diligent
capital defendants. Any judicial analysis must be flexible enough to balance
the goals and the text of the AEDPA with the traditional principles of equity
and fairness embodied in the writ of habeas corpus.

the circumstances preventing the defendant from meeting the statute of limitations be "external"
to the defendant's own conduct), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004).
223. See supra Part III.A (discussing Congress's purpose in enacting the AEDPA).
224. See supra Part IV (discussing the various approaches taken to equitably tolling the
AEDPA statute of limitations in capital habeas cases).
225. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve a dispute concerning
equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations in a noncapital cases. See Pace v. Vaughn,
No. 02-3049, 71 Fed. Appx. 127 (3d Cir. July 7, 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 73 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 03-9627). While Pace raises
equitable tolling questions in the noncapital context, the Court could take this opportunity to
address analogous equitable tolling issues in the capital context as well.
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To account for the myriad considerations at play, courts should first recognize
the primary function and practical operation of AEDPA. Through the AEDPA,
Congress provided a quid pro quo that ensures fast, final resolution of collateral
claims by capital defendants in exchange for assurance that defendants are
competently and adequately represented to guarantee review of their constitutional
claims on the merits.226 The guarantee of counsel is an essential component of this
balance.
Second, courts should acknowledge that dismissing an untimely petition
caused by a negligent appointed attorney violates the arrangement foreseen in the
AEDPA. When the appointed attorney fails to live up to his side of the bargain,
holding the defendant strictly liable for that failure without any evidence of abuse is
unfair and counter to the AEDPA's scheme. Considering the convoluted
relationship between the defendant and appointed counsel, reliance on agency rules
to impute attorney error to the defendant is inappropriate. Instead, violation of the
defendant's right to counsel requires imputing the attorney's error to the state.
Courts should then turn to the doctrine of equitable tolling to carry out the
bargain of the AEDPA. The AEDPA evidences a strong preference for resolving
habeas cases on the merits of the petitions. 2 " Such review benefits not just
defendants by providing another forum to ensure constitutionality, but state death
penalty regimes as well by ensuring the integrity and finality of capital sentences.
B. Conclusion
Maintaining workable and fair habeas corpus procedures for capital cases
requires flexibility. 228 Equitable doctrines afford the flexibility needed to maneuver
through the clunky machinery of the AEDPA. Rather than relying on formalistic
pronouncements that ordinary attorney error can never justify equitable tolling,
courts should inquire into the particular facts of the case to find a resolution that
satisfactorily accommodates the interests of states, defendants, and the AEDPA.
Equitable tolling provides this accommodation.

226. See H.R. REP. No. 104-23, at 10 (1995) (noting that the Powell Committee
recommendations provided a "quid pro quo arrangement under which states are accorded
stronger finality rules on federal habeas review in return for strengthening the right to counsel
for indigent capital defendants").
227. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206-07 (2003) (discussing the AEDPA's
focus on addressing the merits of habeas claims).
228. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,291(1969) ("The very nature of the writ demands
that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of
justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.").

